



Legal scholars are natural scavengers. Perhaps law lies at the intersec-
tion of many bodies of human understanding, or perhaps the four walls of
legal doctrine make for a particularly narrow space. But we can rarely
resist the urge to prowl the terrain of another discipline, and haul its
juiciest morsels back to our lair. Republicanism is our latest find. The
collectivist strain in American politics that was highlighted by historians
in the 1960's, and flourished as an alternative to Rawlsian liberalism in
the early 1980's, has now been appropriated by legal scholars. As this
recycling of ideas is inevitable and invigorating to legal analysis, the issue
is not that it is done, but rather how it is done. Here, I will argue, there
may be cause for concern. The legal foray into republicanism has been
sidetracked by its intellectual premises. Straitened by the distinctive
problems and perspectives of liberal legalism, it has produced a muted
hybrid, oddly focused on the role of the courts.
I. THE VIEW FROM THE CAVE
It is one thing to seize upon an appealing idea; it is another to know
what to do with it. Legal scholarship has been marked by ambivalence
about what republicanism promises the study of law. In the disciplines in
which republicanism has previously emerged, scholars have displayed
greater clarity about its goals, and about its substantive parameters. His-
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torians such as Appleby' and Wood,2 who highlighted the republican
norms in federalist and anti-federalist thought, sought to illuminate the
intellectual currents of the founding. Political theorists such as Sandel s
and Barber," who proposed political participation on the basis of collective
norms, offered a new conception of politics and of humans as political
actors. The works of both groups, albeit different, reflected central tenets
of republican theory: the importance, to both the individual and the
group, of collective discussion and self-direction; the need to appeal to
norms broader than individual interest;' the understanding of republican-
ism as presenting an alternative to the pluralist vision of political life.'
Legal republicanism has trod a different, and less certain, path. Legal
scholars are not observers of a political founding, or unencumbered philos-
ophers reflecting on political life. We are, to paraphrase Michael Walzer,
denizens of a particular cave.' We are influenced by the political regime
in which we find ourselves, and by our distinctive professional relation to
it. Our assumptions have been shaped by a liberal, pluralist institutional
structure, in which collectivism and affirmative citizenship are at best mi-
nor themes. We have largely distanced ourselves from the realm of popu-
lar politics,9 and followed our sense of professional affinity toward the
judiciary. These factors have tended to complicate the legal inquiry into
republicanism. Our internalization of liberal norms and role constraints
has limited our view of republican reform. It has also tempted us to use
republicanism-still ill-defined-to address traditional questions of legal
theory.
The offerings of Professors Michelman and Sunstein illustrate these
difficulties. Michelman's judicial republicanism limits intolerance, and re-
solves a central problem of constitutional theory; but it undervalues the
republican norm of self-conscious popular engagement. Sunstein high-
lights the popular sphere, but allows his liberal suspicion of shared sub-
stantive norms to render his vision incomplete. Such efforts should prompt
a reconsideration of legal republicanism. By reassessing the role of sub-
1. See, e.g., Appleby, The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology, 64 J. AM. HisT.
935 (1978).
2. See, e.g., G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
3. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
4. See, e.g., B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984).
5. See, e.g., id. at 117-261 (1984); H. ARENDT, What is Freedom?, in BETWEEN PAST AND
FUTURE (1961).
6. See, e.g., H. ARENDT, supra note 5; Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of
the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 83-92, 96-100 (R. Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter eds. 1987).
7. See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra note 4; M. SANDEL, supra note 3.
8. See Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379 (1981) (discussing roles of phi-
losophers, political philosophers, and poets in city).
9. It is easy to overstate this point. Some legal scholars, including Professor Sunstein, have taken a
continuing interest in popular political participation. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980) (role of judiciary should include supervision of political process); Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
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stantive norms, and placing legislative participants as well as judges in
our sights, we can reclaim the popular, collectivist strain of republican
thought that has thus far eluded us.
II. RE: THE PEOPLE
For Michelman, republicanism provides a justification for enhancing
the scope of judicial review. But before it can be enlisted in the constitu-
tional cause, republicanism must be purged of its exclusionary and coer-
cive tendencies. Indeed Bowers v. Hardwick,'° Michelman's point of de-
parture, suggests that constitutionalism and republicanism suffer from
similar failings. The popular primacy central to both permitted the citi-
zens of Georgia to exclude sexual nonconformists, and the Court to defer
to their will. Michelman seeks a theory of politics that will simultaneously
discredit the exclusionary urges of "popular authoritarianism," and give
the Court a dominant position in implementing a more inclusive vision.
To find this theory, Michelman turns from the direst consequences, to
what he views as the highest aspirations of the two traditions. He begins
with the paradoxical demand of constitutionalism that citizens be self-
governing, yet that the regime be one of "laws and not men."'" His an-
swer to this conundrum is to conceive of politics "as a process in which
private-regarding 'men' become public-regarding citizens and thus mem-
bers of a people . . . . [B]y virtue of that people-making quality . . .
the process would confer upon its law-like issue the character of law bind-
ing upon all .. . ."" This process, which he refers to as "jurisgenesis,"
also reflects an important strain of republican analysis. According to this
tradition, politics means the discussion of alternatives by reference to a
shared historical, cultural, political, and, ultimately, normative context.
Features of this context are invoked, debated and, over time, revised.
These discussions occur not only in legislative settings, but in agencies,
civic organizations, workplaces and street life. Acts or judgments that
emerge from this process of "re-collection" are regarded as "law," regard-
less of the formal source from which they emanate.
Michelman's jurisgenic notion provides a neat solution to the conun-
drum of "self-government" and "government by laws." Moreover, his
view of law as the expression and revision of a collective identity has con-
siderable appeal. But when this vision is regarded not simply as a recon-
ceptualization, but as a set of acts in which flesh-and-blood citizens en-
gage,13 more substantial doubts arise. The question, as Michelman
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1500 (1988).
12. Id. at 1502.
13. It is conceivable that Michelman's discussion of the popular "conversation" is simply a meta-
phor or analogue for the "re-collective" activities of judges and that he is less concerned with activities
of flesh-and-blood citizens than it might first appear. I find this interpretation unconvincing, however,
1988] 1593
The Yale Law Journal
belatedly observes, is what "a process-based, republican-but-not-pluralist,
constitutional jurisprudence [would] be like.".1 "Jurisgenesis" begins with
a popular conversation, in which participants draw on the features of
their collective identity, expressed in "narratives, analogies and other pro-
fessions of commitment, ' 15 to answer questions about how they should
live. Contemporary plurality prevents this normative context from being
agreed upon in all its details by participants; and social and cultural
change prevents even uncontested features from being static over time.
Thus the conversation, while richly plural, is non-pluralist in two senses.
First, participants with differing perspectives appeal to each other, in
hopes of changing each other's normative understandings. Second, partici-
pants regard any change of mind that results not as coercive, but as part
of the normative reconsideration that goes on even in the midst of histori-
cal or cultural continuity. The informal setting of many of these conversa-
tions is, as noted above, a final defining characteristic.
Yet jurisgenesis is not exclusively, or even primarily, popular. Presiding
over these "jurisgenerative popular conversation[s]" are the courts.
Michelman describes them as "assisting in the maintenance"" of the pop-
ular dialogue; but in fact their role is more substantial. His critique of
Ackerman's theory" as enslaving the Court to popular authoritarianism,
and his contrasting praise of the Court's leadership in the Brown era,
suggest the kind of role he intends. The courts consider the varying and
sometimes cacaphonous strains of the popular conversation; they extract
those themes that seem to them most consistent with their vision of the
community as it has evolved over time. In particular, they enforce the
inclusionary commitment that may be overlooked by other participants,
bringing into the community those "at the margins" whose differing vi-
sions enrich its common life. Michelman stops short of a strong claim that
courts have greater competence at jurisgenerative "re-collection" than
popular participants. Yet his reluctance to designate a limited realm of
popular primacy, and his declaration that even a scheme of intermittent
judicial deference risks popular authoritarianism, seem to establish the ju-
diciary as the dominant partner.
The greatest enigma of Michelman's theory is the nature of the popular
role. Many practical features of this role remain obscure. Michelman does
not distinguish, for example, between legislative officials and ordinary
participants; nor does he explain the institutional consequences of the shift
from legislative primacy. Michelman also fails to clarify a more central,
given his insistence, in discussing the classical roles of "founder" and "citizen," id. at 1515-18, that
contemporary republicans should understand that the citizen's role is one of "activity."
14. Id. at 1526.
15. Id. at 1513.
16. Id. at 1525.
17. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1013
(1984). Ackerman's theory is discussed infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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republican issue: the citizens' understanding of their own political role.
One might conclude from Michelman's description of non-pluralist ex-
change that political self-awareness is a distinguishing feature of the juris-
genic conversation. Two factors, however, militate against this conclusion.
First, Michelman's vision of jurisgenesis is abstract and complex.1 s It
seems unlikely that the average participant would be able to understand
her role the way Michelman does. Particularly where the normative
framework is that of a nationwide community, citizens lacking Tocquevil-
lian exposure or a prodigious capacity for abstraction might encounter dif-
ficulty with the re-collective process. Those fighting their way in from the
margins, or pressing for some discrete political change, might have some
advantage in this regard: They could develop an alternate, concrete way of
explaining their relationship to the political process.19 But such an expla-
nation might not be available to the mainstream participant, who has
neither programmatic nor theoretical resources for describing her civic
purpose.
A second factor militating against political self-comprehension is the va-
ried and often informal character of Michelman's popular participation.
Many citizens who lack philosophical sophistication currently understand
their role by understanding the institutions in which it occurs. Michelman
rejects this institutional orientation. He does not look primarily to legisla-
tures to find jurisgenerative conversations, but to agencies, clubs, work-
places-even the street. Michelman views the prevalence of informal en-
gagement as a virtue, tracing its lineage to Ackerman's anti-formalist
understanding of constitutional "conventions." 2 Yet there are important
differences between the political mobilization that preceded the Revolu-
tion-or even the New Deal-and the day-to-day exchanges that form the
basis of Michelman's popular participation. Participants in the former
mobilizations had a set of discrete, political purposes in mind; and they
turned to informal channels because formal institutional channels re-
mained closed to their insurgency. Citizens under Michelman's scheme
18. Michelman describes his vision itself as a "re-collection" citizens ought to recognize as conso-
nant with their deepest political assumptions. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1513-14. I suspect, how-
ever, that he underestimates the difficulty citizens will face in putting the pieces together. If my
experience is not atypical, comprehending his process is likely to challenge many a judge and law
professor, not to mention the untutored participant. And while I believe we can learn much by attend-
ing to intuition, I do not consider intuitive flashes of consonance to be a substitute for careful political
self-understanding.
19. Here, as Michelman's narrative suggests, the political mobilization of black Americans pro-
vides a good example. A participant in the civil rights struggle might not have explained-in
Michelman's terms-that she was enriching the collective normative context by the introduction of a
politically marginal vision. But even children taking part in the marches and demonstrations of the
late 1950's and early 1960's could explain that they were winning their freedom. See, e.g., R. NELSON
& S. WEBB, SELMA, LORD, SELMA (1980) (autobiographical narrative of civil rights struggle demon-
strating political awareness of six- and eight-year old participants).
20. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1519.
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need no particular occasion to go "out of doors,"21; their informal partici-
pation occurs on an ongoing basis. The people are, in one sense, always
(though in a more important sense, rarely) making law. They may not
even be aware that they are doing it. They may think they are recom-
mending a location for the city park or repeating a story about the incum-
bent governor, but they are actually initiating the process of jurisgenesis.
Michelman's view of popular participation is troubling for several rea-
sons. First, the pervasive yet apparently undemanding "jurisgenerative
conversation" masks a substantial diminution in the popular role. The
narratives, professions and conversations that create a collective identity
are not, as Michelman points out, anything new. People can and do en-
gage in these exchanges currently, although they generally mean little to
the institutions of government. Under Michelman's view they would be-
come crucial fodder for judicial decisionmaking-though they could also
be rejected by a judiciary that is empowered to choose among them. Yet if
the people's "re-collections" are permitted to contribute to the formation
of law, their institutions are no longer accorded the political primacy they
enjoy under the present regime.
One may also question a popular role that is such an unself-conscious,
quotidien affair. The people's self-awareness seems particularly limited
when compared to that of the courts. We may assume that courts, in order
to understand the "re-collective" choices that ground their sovereignty,
must comprehend the process of jurisgenesis and their role in it.22 If the
people's contribution consists of unself-conscious conversations in
churches, pubs and workplaces, it is hard to credit Michelman's sugges-
tion that the courts and the people play equal, if contrasting roles of "se-
curity" and "activity."2 On the contrary, Michelman may help to resur-
rect the classical republican distinction between "founders," who establish
the crucial features of the regime, and "citizens," who maintain it on a
daily basis. The popular normative "revision" is so continuous, incremen-
tal and unself-conscious that it would be difficult to understand it as the
kind of rennovative work that belongs to the architects and builders of a
regime.14
21. See G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 340-50 (using term "people out of doors" to refer to informal
or extra-institutional political mobilization).
22. 1 suppose it is possible that the courts also hold some limited, non-theoretical view of their
role, much like the mobilizing "marginal" participants. Yet I would be inclined to take a dim view of
a process of lawmaking whose operation is fully understood only by its creator and not by any of the
participants.
23. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1518. This language comes from the section in which
Michelman discusses a potential revision of the classical republican roles of "founder" and "citizen."
He characterizes the former role as embodying "security" and the latter, "activity."
24. The unself-conscious, quotidian character of this role casts an odd light on Michelman's clos-
ing argument for reconnecting the right of privacy and public life. Michelman's conception of a new
grounding for the right of pricacy is thought-provoking, if incomplete (e.g., he notes that the ancient
citizen's "sense of self-direction" was replenished by the "daily experience of his domestic master-
ship." Michelman, supra note 11, at 1535 n.175, but is far less explicit in describing the modem
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More importantly, the informal popular role seems flawed from a re-
publican perspective. If people contribute through expressions and ex-
changes they do not perceive as political, they may not have the experi-
ence of leaving a personal domain, marked by individualized assessments,
for a sphere that is shaped by collective ends. Moreover, because these
participants are not galvanized by the need for decision or action, they
may not fully consider the perspectives of others. Also lacking in this
scheme of casual, unofficial participation may be the experience of making
collective decisions: "the possibility of an entire community consciously
and jointly shaping . . its way of life."25 These defects may hinder the
moral development of participants, a matter into which Michelman claims
little insight.2 6 But they may also impair the development of solidarity and
political empathy,27  qualities that are of value to any collectiv-
ity-particularly one that hopes to avoid exclusion and coercion of margi-
nal groups.
A second set of problems with Michelman's vision concerns the political
centrality that he grants the courts. The question is not whether the courts
should be trusted with this authority-though cases such as Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union2 8 should lead us to question both the inclusionary
commitment and "re-collective" potential of the judicial branch. The
question is whether other participants merit the displacement they receive
in Michelman's republican vision. Popular institutions are displaced be-
cause their political primacy results in an "authoritarianism" that is coer-
cive and, more importantly, exclusive. This claim does not lack for sup-
port, as both the Georgia sodomy statute and the wretched history of
segregation attest. Yet such exclusion, if inevitable, is not a consistent pat-
tern. Non-judicial bodies were also responsible for the Civil War Amend-
ments, and the pathbreaking legislation of the New Deal and Great Soci-
ety. Although Brown is a crucial example of transformative, inclusive
adjudication, one can still ask whether Brown-any more than the
"switch in time [that saved nine]"' 9-should be regarded as a single, mon-
olithic paradigm for the making of law.
counterpart of this relation). Yet the abstract valuation and nurturance provided the citizen by this re-
collection of doctrine ultimately dwarf the public role for which they are intended to prepare her.
25. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 PoL- THEORY 327, 344 (1981). Oddly
enough, Michelman hails this as "the best contemporary statement of [participation] I know,"
Michelman, supra note 11, at 1503, but designs a jurisgenic process in which it is not possible.
26. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1504. It is typical of Michelman's instrumental approach to
republicanism that he eschews focus on those republican understandings that are good for the soul of
the individual-and apparently those that are good for the cohesion of the community-to pursue
those that "contemporary constitutional explanation and analysis cannot do without."
27. Sunstein makes this point eloquently in Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1547 (1988).
28. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (proposing reconsideration of Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976)).
29. Ackerman, supra note 17, at 1052. Ackerman argues that the "switch in time," historically
thought to be motivated by Roosevelt's proposed packing of the court, was actually spurred by the
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Greater gains might be achieved by a theory that posits variation in the
patterns of lawmaking, or-to use Michelman's phrase-periodicity in the
demands of citizenship.3" Michelman considers this alternative in the form
of Ackerman's publian theory, which he dismisses because of its tendency
to foster "popular authoritarianism." While Michelman may be correct in
saying that Ackerman erects no specific barriers against authoritarian ex-
clusion, he errs in dismissing periodicity on such a slim critique. Periodic
theories offer two insights that Michelman's more categorical role depic-
tion does not provide. The first is the recognition that though a group or
institution may pose a distinctive political danger, its motivation and con-
duct are likely to vary over time. Even the apathetic participants Acker-
man describes as "perfect privatists" 1 can sometimes be inspired to exert
themselves in the political realm. The challenge is to use the group's ener-
gies when they can be properly focused, and limit the damage from its
distinctive liabilities at other times.
The second insight is that in a system where governmental institutions
are structured to produce differing perspectives, no single institution is
likely to be able to identify all the changes that could enrich the collective
life. The court perceived the need to include minorities who had remained
for decades on the margins of political life. But Congress and the execu-
tive branch perceived the need for the economic transformation that pro-
duced the New Deal. A scheme that permits different institutional combi-
nations in fundamental lawmaking may best be able to channel the
creative and perceptive energies of all participants. Ackerman's notion of
structural amendment reflects this insight. His point is not, as Michelman
seems at times to suggest, that a single process of structural amendment
embodied by the New Deal should replace the specifications of Article V.
It is that there are many institutional combinations through which
landmark legal change can be achieved, all of which are characterized by
a period of self-conscious popular mobilization and choice.3 2 Michelman
sacrifices this variety, as well as the moral and political benefits of the
self-conscious mobilization, in order to avoid the dangers of exclusive au-
thoritarianism. This seems a high price to pay. It may be necessary, if we
credit Michelman's charge, to create a periodic theory that views popular
coercion, rather than popular apathy, as the central political danger. But
Court's recognition that a process of structural amendment had taken place.
30. See Michelman, supra note 11, at 1519-24.
31. Ackerman, supra note 17, at 1033.
32. Id. at 1053-70. Ackerman describes the process of structural amendment not as a judicial
ratification of a popular decision, but as a "highly charged dialogue among branches of government,"
id. at 1055, in which popular participants are first among equals-if indeed they enjoy any primacy
at all. His point that the forms of structural amendments may differ can be drawn from his discussion
of two such amendments: the New Deal's renunciation of Lochner and the formally dubious enact-
ment of the Civil War Amendments. Michelman is, however, correct that one of Ackerman's purposes
in the Storrs Lectures is to establish the legitimacy of activist judicial review, and he does so by
reference to the judiciary's engagement with a mobilized citizenry.
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we would do better alternately to tap and to control popular initiative,
than to exile popular participants from the realm of self-conscious politi-
cal action.
III. THE DANGLING CONVERSATION
If Michelman views republicanism as a means of saving constitutional
theory, Sunstein's approach is less instrumental. He seeks to transform
republicanism, long an object of historical interest, into a modern theory
of practical promise. His main interest, in contrast to Michelman, is in
the nature of popular participation. Sunstein rejects the meager role of
interested dealmaking that popular politics has been assigned by liberal
theory. He offers instead a model of public-spirited dialogue that is imple-
mented by judicial and sometimes non-judicial means.
Yet if Sunstein is committed to republican participation, he is also
haunted by a characteristically liberal dilemma. Although he wants to as-
sert that legislative agreement can be achieved through dialogue, he is re-
luctant to constrain the plurality of participants by imposing substantive
norms. His reluctance reflects a skepticism about objective "truth" 3 that
has both liberal and critical versions.34 But it arises mainly from a concern
about the coercive potential of shared norms. Like Michelman, Sunstein is
wary of "collectivist" forms of republicanism 5 and alert to the oppression
that can be perpetrated by the state or mobilized groups of citizens.3" Yet
while Michelman insists on a substantive vision but implements it through
the courts, Sunstein insists on popular primacy but equivocates on the use
of substantive norms. This equivocation mars Sunstein's depiction of re-
publican participation and restricts the range of his reforms. Because he
cannot describe how dialogic exchange gives rise to legislative agreement,
he is obliged to implement republican "deliberation" through proxies too
broad to alter participatory behavior.
Sunstein's republicanism is defined by four norms: deliberation, equal-
ity of political actors, universality, and citizenship. Deliberation, the cen-
tral value, means that "laws must be supported by argument and rea-
sons."37 Moreover, private interest does not supply a sufficient basis for
argument: "Political actors must justify their choices by appealing to a
33. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1554-56.
34. See, e.g., J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 17-52 ("truth," if it exists, emerges through extended process
of exchange and discussion; to assert it without such is not to find "truth" but assume infallibility)
(liberal version); Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987) [hereinafter
Justice Engendcred] (there is no objectively "true" view of world, but only differing perspectives that
emerge from proponents' situations) (critical version).
35. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1539, 1566 (apparent sympathy with critics of Benjamin
Rush).
36. See id. at 1569 (private organizations can also be source of oppression).
37. See id. at 1544.
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broader public good.""8 Deliberation, however, is not embraced solely as
an end. It is intended to produce decisions-decisions that are sometimes
substantively preferable to those obtained in other ways. Sunstein ex-
presses his faith in the connection between dialogue and legislative agree-
ment with the concept of universalism: "the possibility of mediating differ-
ent approaches to politics, or different conceptions of the public good,
through discussion and dialogue."39
Whether and how differing perspectives can be mediated through dia-
logue is the most important question for Sunstein's theory. The answer is
not clear. In some cases mediation can be achieved by means of broadly
supported substantive principles that lead discussants to a common result.
"The requirement of deliberation," Sunstein states, "embodies substantive
limitations that in some settings lead to uniquely correct outcomes." 40
Two examples of such constraints are "freedom of speech" and "the pro-
hibition of discrimination against blacks and women."141 At the other end
of the spectrum lie cases in which mediation will be impossible:
"[R]epublicans [do not] deny that differently situated individuals. . . will
frequently be unable to resolve their disagreements through conversation.
Sometimes compromises are necessary; sometimes there will be political
losers .... -4' But in the great run of cases, Sunstein suggests, mediation
will be neither impossible nor unproblematic. In these cases, the outcome
will be judged "substantively correct" by the criterion of "agreement
among political equals."4 3 The discussion will reflect "a commitment to
political empathy, embodied in a requirement that political actors attempt
to assume the position of those who disagree." 44
Even this empathic stance, however, is not wholly adequate as a
description of mediation. It is not evident how one progresses from taking
the viewpoint of another to agreeing on a particular resolution. Moreover,
one of the most thoughtful proponents of the empathic deliberation has
cast doubt on the capacity of such deliberation, in and of itself, to produce
substantive choice.45
Martha Minow embraces the empathic stance as a concomitant of her
feminist critique of objectivity.46 According to this critique, there is no
38. Id.; see also id. at 1551.
39. Id. at 1554.
40. Id. at 1550.
41. Id. These constraints might be understood to enjoy wide support on the ground that they are
essential or prior to the dialogic process itself. However, given that they are stated at a remarkably
high level of generality, I would suspect that the number of cases they are capable of resolving is
extremely limited. As Sunstein certainly must realize, it is difficult to know what measures fall within
these general terms, or whether they would still produce agreement when other similarly prevalent
norms are offered in support of a competing point of view.
42. Id. at 1555.
43. Id. at 1554.
44. Id. at 1555.
45. See Justice Engendered, supra note 34, at 90-95.
46. Minow does not claim to have originated this critique. It has figured prominently in the work
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such thing as an "objective" or "unsituated" perspective. One means of
ameliorating the partiality of decisionmakers-in Minow's case,
judges-is to require them to place themselves in the position of the dis-
empowered. Yet this is only the first step of sound adjudication. The "de-
liberative" judge, who considers a variety of perspectives, is also obliged to
mediate among them. Minow acknowledges this problem, and suggests
that judges can avoid paralysis by making choices based on their "commit-
ments."'4  But the distance between empathic deliberation and substantive
affiliation that constitutes a "commitment" quickly becomes evident. Mi-
now explicitly declines to specify the commitments to which judges should
resort, or to derive a meta-commitment from the critique of objectivity
itself, noting that such a choice would embody precisely the partiality she
has decried.4 8 As Minow's conundrum reveals, empathic deliberation may
be in tension with the need to reach decisions, and may ultimately necessi-
tate resolution by substantive principles. 9
It may be harsh to fault Sunstein for presenting an equivocal or unfin-
ished portrait of republican deliberation. IHe takes American plurality as
he finds it, and steadfastly resists the urge to claim more for republican-
ism than he is able to demonstrate or support. And a plausible, liberal
fear of coercion prevents him from prescribing an increase in mediation by
substantive norms. But the incomplete character of his account leaves a
residue of doubt. While the self-understanding and the initial interaction
of republican participants may be different, the lack of a shared normative
framework may lead them to compromise, aggregate or otherwise resolve
their differences in the ways that pluralists do. These doubts are further
exacerbated by Sunstein's proposals for republican reform. These propos-
als, products of a laudable wish to commence practical change, reflect and
highlight the ambiguities in Sunstein's vision.
Sunstein offers numerous suggestions, from judicial endorsement of
campaign finance regulation to local autonomy; from reinterpretation of
the canons of statutory construction to proportional legislative representa-
of Catharine MacKinnon, as well as of many radical feminists of color. See C. MACKINNON, FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED (1987); G. ANZALDUA & C. MORAGA, THIS BRIDGE CALLED My BACK: WRrr-
INGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 34 (1981).
47. See Justice Engendered, supra note 34, at 91. Minow describes such commitments as "sub-
stantive" in nature, and notes "[w]e make commitments when we make decisions; we reconfirm or
remake current understandings by reflecting so deeply and particularly about a new situation that we
challenge presumptive solutions . . . [wle . . .make decisions by immersing in particulars to renew
commitments to a fair world."
48. See id. at 93. Minow states: "(R]ather than pretending to secure a permanent solution
through a 'neutral' rule, I must acknowledge the tragedy of non-neutrality-and admit that our very
commitment to tolerance yields intolerance toward some views."
49. See id. at 92-93. It appears that Minow sees a different culmination for empathic deliberation
than does Sunstein when she notes, "[elven when we understand them, some voices will lose." Id. at
92. Sunstein views a decisional process that produces political losers as an occasional, if foreseeable,
failure of deliberation. Minow, more realistically, views it as a natural, if regrettable, consequence of
deliberation in a diverse community.
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tion. Though their variety testifies to the many ways that republican the-
ory can shape the political environment, they share several features that
are troubling. First, they rely disproportionately on judicial enforcement."0
Not only are Sunstein's judicial proposals among his most fully developed,
but even some of his non-judicial suggestions are implemented by judicial
means: local autonomy, for example, is protected in part by a narrow
judicial approach to federal pre-emption. This might be criticized, first, as
a circuitous approach to transforming popular participation. But there is a
more critical problem. The proposed scrutiny occurs at a level of general-
ity that is likely to obscure rather than clarify the features of legislative
"deliberation." Courts may apply narrow construction to appropriations
statutes, for example, on the ground that "deliberation is least likely in
the appropriations process." Yet this approach is based on the broad con-
clusion that "the appropriations process is comparatively likely to be dom-
inated by well-organized private groups ... [and] lacks visibility."'" Not
only is it unlikely that the cited features go to the essence of delibera-
tion-there are few portions of the legislative processes that are highly
visible or free from the influence of private groups-but this approach
requires no scrutiny of the process that produced the legislation in ques-
tion. Similarly, when judges foster local autonomy through a narrow ap-
proach to pre-emption, this solicitude does not seem to depend on the spe-
cific character of the local process. There are local legislative processes
that are deliberative, and there are others that are intransigently pluralis-
tic. It is important that judicial scrutiny distinguish between them: but to
do so, a judge would need a more fully elaborated vision of the delibera-
tive process. Perhaps because Sunstein is ambivalent about certain fea-
tures of this process, he refrains from offering more specific proposals for
review, as well as from designing institutions that would foster delibera-
tion directly. 2 Over the long run, however, reliance on such general or
abstract judicial assessments would seem to dull rather than heighten our
sense of the exchange to which participants should aspire.
50. 1 do not mean to suggest that Sunstein fails to offer non-judicial suggestions. In fact, he makes
several, including proportional representation, local autonomy, and greater scope for private organiza-
tions. My point is simply that, given his goal of reforming popular political behavior, he expends a
disproportionate amount of effort on the seemingly blunt tool of the judiciary; and that, aside from
advocating proportional representation, he commits little attention to the question of popular institu-
tional reform.
51. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1582.
52. The one salient exception to this characterization is Sunstein's proposal for proportional legis-
lative representation. However, embodying different viewpoints in distinct legislative delegations may
be viewed as acknowledging the impossibility of meaningful deliberation, rather than facilitating it.
Sunstein seems to acknowledge this point when he notes, "fin this respect, group representation
would be a kind of second-best solution for the real-world failures of Madisonian deliberation." Id. at
1588. For a discussion of how greater deliberative interaction can be fostered by eschewing propor-
tional representation in favor of other districting strategies, see Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Mi-
nority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449 (1988).
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IV. REVIVING REPUBLICANISM
It is ironic that the latest, legal contribution has shifted the focus of
republican thought away from popular participants. In their distinctive
ways, both Michelman and Sunstein redirect our attention to the activities
of a narrower citizenry: members of the judiciary. For Michelman, this
redirection is an end in itself: He transforms our understanding of "law,"
and vastly enhances the role of judges in making it, in order to protect
American constitutionalism from the excesses of "popular authoritarian-
ism." For Sunstein, recourse to the judiciary is largely instrumental. His
"deliberative" politics is a prescription for participants in all phases of
lawmaking. Yet Sunstein views the judiciary as a crucial instrument for
shaping popular behavior. Focusing on the judiciary also permits Sunstein
to proceed at a distance from thorny questions about deliberation and sub-
stantive norms. Each of these views has drawbacks as an attempt to redi-
rect republican theory: The former reflects a retreat from the collective
self-direction of mobilized citizens that has been the hallmark of republi-
can thought;53 the latter, a circuitous way of achieving it. Yet the concern
about republicanism that underlies both-the coercive potential of citizens
united by shared norms-is one that should not be ignored. The question
is whether it is possible to re-animate the broadly participatory strain of
republican thought without triggering the danger of popular coercion."
Not surprisingly, the foundations for such a conception can be drawn
from Sunstein and Michelman themselves. Sunstein highlights the self-
conscious participation of the people, and the use of deliberation in gov-
ernmental institutions. His participants understand that they are not sim-
ply musing on politics, but are making choices that concern their common
life. They know, moreover, that they must deliberate according to criteria
more encompassing than their own interests. It may be difficult to define
the term "public-regarding," particularly at the level of national politics.
But the term nonetheless suggests that what is good for the group may be
different from what is good for one member. And it conveys the value of
recognizing and attending to different versions of this "good" when mak-
ing group decisions.
Michelman supplies an element that Sunstein does not fully capture:
the notion that a group's "good"-the principles that mediate collective
53. I concur in Herzog's critique that the historical emergence of a particular feature of republi-
canism ought not, in and of itself, validate it for political practice today. See Herzog, Some Questions
for Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473, 475 (1986). However, taking the more Michelmanian view
that republicanism demonstrates a certain thematic continuity despite its evolution over time, I would
identify self-aware, popular self-direction according to norms more encompassing than the individual
preferences of participants to be one of these continuing themes.
54. In this sense, my definition of the republican challenge is probably closer to Sunstein's than to
Michelman's. Michelman seeks to eliminate the exclusivity or coercion that now occurs, or at least to
eliminate judicial acquiescence in such patterns. Sunstein appears to be more concerned with the
enhanced patterns of coercion that might be the outgrowth of a new focus on shared norms.
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discussions-should be understood as a set of identifiable, yet evolving,
substantive norms. Michelman's judges perceive that each community's
history, culture, and politics create a fund of shared norms. They may be
characterized in different ways, they may change or evolve over time, but
they are sufficiently continuous and recognizable to guide crucial political
choices. If this kind of the normative framework could be made accessible
to popular participants as well, it would complete a blueprint for a popu-
lar republican theory.
A. Nonjudicial Institutions
If these features show us where republican theory should be going, we
have next to ask how we can get there. This question requires us to re-
consider the recent judicial focus. If our goal is to recast the role of popu-
lar participants in making decisions for a community, it seems odd to look
for primary guidance from the courts.55 Such courts handle startlingly few
cases, and address most of these in a responsive posture. Save a few areas,
where their most important role has been remedial or prohibitory, their
influence on the behavior of most citizens is indirect and diffuse. If we
want to encourage citizens to rethink their political behavior, we need ap-
proaches that are more likely to command their attention on a day-to-day
basis.
Here, perhaps, we could take a leaf from the framers' book: the citi-
zens' relationship to the polity is formed by popular political institutions.
The self-interested pluralist norms of American citizens were shaped by
the extended sphere, the intragovernmental system of checks and balances.
It was only after this groundwork had been laid that the norms generated
began to be enforced by the federal courts. If we want to foster republican
norms, we should turn our attention to popular institutions. This goal
might be addressed through reform of the federal legislative process, but
such an approach holds obvious risks. First, federal institutions are
uniquely distant from the lives of most participants. The average citizen
would have little contact with the structures or practices that were in-
tended to reform her political behavior. Moreover, federal institutions
have been shaped to a considerable degree by pluralist values. Efforts to
redesign existing institutions might be muted or distorted by the prevailing
political ethos-a special hazard when republicanism is incompletely de-
fined. It seems more useful to turn to new, distinctively republican institu-
55. These arguments apply, a fortiori, when this role is further restricted to the federal courts.
This restriction is implicit in the schemes of both theorists. When Sunstein talks about the redirection
of pre-emption doctrine, see Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1582, or the First Amendment view of federal
campaign finance legislation, see id. at 1576-78, it seems likely that he refers to the federal courts.
Because Michelman's argument is more abstract and less institutional, it is harder to tell; but judges
not insulated by article III protections from political pressure would appear to lack the requisite
distance from "popular authoritarianism" effectively to constrain it.
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tions, in which citizens can experiment with a more self-conscious, collec-
tive form of political life.
Local political institutions, as theorists since Rousseau have argued,
provide fertile ground for republican participation.56 Even Sunstein en-
dorses local autonomy, though he is cryptic about its specific advantages.
Local institutions might contribute to the development of a self-conscious,
normatively-based, deliberative popular politics in several ways. First, lo-
cal politics and local political institutions are highly visible to most citi-
zens and provide the easiest opportunities for direct political involvement.
Their processes-and, at times, their products-can present citizens with
a constant invitation to consider a new type of political life. Local institu-
tions also tap the particularized norms that can become the basis for polit-
ical action. Localities share histories and traditions that may be more vivid
or tangible to their citizens than those of the state or nation; it may there-
fore be easier for citizens to grasp common norms at an applicable level of
specificity. Because local citizens can see in comparatively concrete terms
the ways in which their communities both change over time and retain a
definable character, they may be better able to understand the kind of
normative revision that occurs through decisionmaking.57 Finally, focusing
on local institutions reduces the possibility that shared norms will have a
coercive impact on participants. This is true not only because the number
and variety of local communities combats the impression that a given com-
munity's values comprise "objective truth." Local citizenship also provides
unique opportunities for exit from a potentially coercive polity. Local
polities control questions of citizenship and inclusion over only a limited
domain. If a neighborhood or municipal body persists in acting on norms
that a resident does not share, it is often possible to find a new neighbor-
hood or relocate to a nearby town.5" Such movement is not always an
option, particularly for socio-economically disadvantaged citizens, but it is
more feasible than in any larger political context.
It would, of course, be naive to suggest that simply propagating local
56. They also have enjoyed an enthusiastic contemporary revival, which continues to the present
day. See, e.g., B. Barber, supra note 4; J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980);
H. ARENDT, ON REvOLuTIoN 234-59 (1965). I make no claim to originality in the re-discovery of
local political institutions: on the contrary, I wish to close with an act of creative scavenging. My point
here is to argue that these institutions respond not only to the goals identified by democratic theorists,
but also to the distinctive concerns raised by legal republicans such as Michelman and Sunstein.
57. Whether the average participant can ultimately become comfortable with the process of "re-
collection" over a broader geographical and cultural range (and therefore at a higher level of abstrac-
tion) is unclear, and is, moreover, a question as to which I am agnostic. However, it seems evident
that if a participant does not experience this process first at the local level, where it is more accessible,
she is unlikely to be able to engage in it at the national level.
58. Cf. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). The Tie-
bout model of local expenditure is built on a similar assumption that citizens will move to the locality
that offers the package of municipal services that best suits their needs. Its applicability to those less
mobile by virtue of socioeconomic status or other disadvantages might, however, be called into ques-
tion; hence the proviso in the text.
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institutions would be sufficient to foster republican political activity.
There is a great deal of local decisionmaking that conforms to the plural-
ist model. If we want to foster a self-conscious politics of collective sub-
stantive choice, we must consider the kinds of local institutions that will
contribute to its development. Certain features of republican participation
will have to be clarified before we can fully address the question of insti-
tutional design: What are the kinds of normative agreements that are
likely to exist and to mediate republican dialogue at the local level? If
such agreements are likely to extend mainly to goals, to what extent will
this help mediate discussions concerning means? Yet, even if we begin
with the fairly general features of republican participation highlighted
above, it is possible to identify several institutional questions that will re-
quire further consideration. One set of questions concerns the appropriate
size of the "local" polity. If accessibility and identifiability of common
norms are crucial, for example, it may be useful to start at the sub-local
or neighborhood level. 9 Another set of questions concerns the locus of
political organization. Many models of local government are organized ge-
ographically, around the city or neighborhood council; but in some areas,
it may better capture citizens' primary affiliations to organize local insti-
tutions around the workplace. Perhaps the most important set of questions
concerns the decision procedures most likely to encourage the desired
forms of political interaction. If the invocation of common substantive
norms in many cases permits participants to reach agreement through de-
liberation, for example, it may be more appropriate to use consensus-
based procedures than aggregative voting.
B. Combatting the Threat of Exclusion
If properly designed, local institutions may provide one means of en-
couraging new forms of popular participation. Yet they may not fully re-
spond to the second challenge of contemporary republican theory: combat-
ting the danger of coercive politics. The plurality of local communities and
the possibility of exit diminish the both the likelihood and the impact of
coercive politics. Moreover, the potential of local participants to engage in
self-revising normative decisionmaking may encourage a more inclusive
ethos, and reduce intolerance of those on the margins."0 Yet localities have
59. Creating institutions at the neighborhood level may also have another advantage: Because
many neighborhoods do not now have their own political institutions, reformers will not have to deal
with an established pluralist ethos that has taken root in a set of existing institutions.
60. Some communities may embrace tolerance of diversity or non-conformity as a shared substan-
tive norm. College towns, such as Ann Arbor, Michigan or Berkeley, California, have historically
been distinguished by such norms. It may also be possible to describe the value of inclusive solicitude
as a norm instrumental to the achievement of other substantive norms in the community, as
Michelman does in describing the American polity. However, neither of these solutions will be appro-
priate for all localities at all times.
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a disturbing history of intolerance toward non-conforming groups"1 that
even these reforms may not eradicate. It may be necessary to consider
institutional strategies, not for preventing exclusionary urges, but for neu-
tralizing their effects as they arise.
Two kinds of institutional approaches warrant further inquiry. The
first is the exercise of concurrent powers. This approach would permit
local bodies, operating according to the normative principles described
above, to make decisions in conjunction with municipal or state bodies
that have historically operated on a pluralist basis. This strategy has been
employed in several municipal ordinances that have granted neighborhood
groups power over development decisions.62 The rationale for concurrent
powers is either that the pluralist body is less likely to be afflicted by
exclusive tendencies, or that the tendencies of one group are unlikely to
coincide with those of the other, thus reducing the chance that an exclu-
sive urge will become law. The principle of concurrent decisionmaking
may be implemented in a variety of ways, depending on the desired bal-
ance between republican decisionmaking and potentially exclusive out-
comes. Authorizing legislation could require, for example, the approval of
both bodies before proposals could be enacted, or that the two groups en-
gage in (various types of) deliberation before reaching a collective conclu-
sion. Concurrent approaches would offer the additional advantage of ex-
posing participants who operate primarily within pluralist institutions to
more republican forms of decisionmaking.
A second approach is a variant on the kind of periodic citizenship pro-
posed by Bruce Ackerman. This strategy would require a separate institu-
tion, better equipped to propound the norms of inclusion, to check local
excesses when and where they occur. Considerable theoretical authority
exists for assigning this role to the courts.6" The Mount Laurel case illus-
trates how judicial intervention might combat the exclusive tendencies of
neighborhood decisionmaking.6' However, this function might also be per-
61. This problem may, ironically, be due in part to the limited domain of local politics. The
common norms and practices may seem so familiar-and alternatives so distant-as to make non-
conformity more starkly unappealing.
62. Some of these ordinances have been enacted; others are still in the planning stages. Among
them, they offer several different approaches to the concurrent exercise of power over development.
The "Neighborhood Councils" Proposal, drafted by Boston's Coalition for Community Control of
Development-for which I have served as a legal advisor-permits neighborhood councils and munici-
pal agencies to share power over some aspects of development (e.g., both groups can classify planning
overlay districts) and to exercise distinct but interrelated powers over others (e.g., neighborhood coun-
cils can grant zoning variances that relate to use, height, and density; the Zoning Board of Appeals
can grant variances that relate to any other issue). Other ordinances, such as the "Early Warning"
system in place in Minneapolis, provide for advisory powers to neighborhood groups. Proposals that
grant neighborhood groups mere advisory powers may not be sufficient to foster republican
participation.
63. See J. ELY, supra note 9. Justice Brennan has also suggested such a role for Congress acting
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10
(1966) (Brennan, J.).
64. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
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formed by state legislatures under conflict or pre-emption doctrines. This
would not alter the primary political power of local republican bodies, but
it would authorize another institution to displace or reverse the popular
authority in those cases where the distinctive risks of its political involve-
ment materialized.
Recovering the popular strain in republican theory may prove a chal-
lenging task for legal scholars. It requires that we depart from our habit-
ual scrutiny of the judiciary, and confront the noisy intolerance of popular
participants. Yet the task promises great rewards. Through this effort we
may learn to view ourselves as institutional architects, as well as judicial
advisors. And we may give republican meaning to the Madisonian insight
that the best institutions stand ready to control the vices of their citizens,
even as they attempt to foster their virtues.
A.2d 713 (striking down proposed zoning schemes that excluded low income families), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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